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At dawn on the 5th of April 1925, a force of 621 men comprising c i t i zen
force troops and pol ice surrounded the town of Rehoboth in South West Africa.
The i r object was to secure the a r r e s t of three men who had fa i led to respond
to summonses issued under the stock branding proclamation. Seven days previously
a large group of supporters had prevented three local policemen from en te r ing
the bui lding where the men were s taying . In response to th i s act of def iance ,
t h e Administrator had mobilized the c i t i zen force in nine d i s t r i c t s and declared
(2)
m a r t i a l law in Rehoboth.
At 7am a messenger entered the town carrying an ultimatum from Col. de Jager ,
commander of the t roops . I t cal led for an unconditional surrender by 8am.
The rebels asked for more time in order to evacuate the women and ch i ld ren , but
at 8.15am three aeroplanes f i t t e d with machine guns flew low over the town and
the sold iers charged. Faced with t h i s vas t ly superior force, the rebels offered
l i t t l e r e s i s t a n c e , and no shots were f i red . The so ld ie r s and policemen were
spurred on by de Jager to attack t he i r opponents with s t i cks arid r i f l e b u t t s .
Women and children who surrounded the rebel headquarters in an attempt to
(4)
protect t he i r menfolk inside were also quickly dea l t with in th i s way.
Six hundred and t h i r t y two people were a r res ted on charges of i l l e g a l assembly
and 304 firearms were confiscated. All of the weapons were subsequently
declared 'unservicable f and destroyed.
Organised res is tance had begun some twenty months e a r l i e r on the 17th of
August 1923. An agreement had been concluded on that day between the Union
Government, represented by the Administrator of South West Africa; and the Baster
Counci l , on behalf of the Rehoboth community. The t r ea ty demarcated the
boundaries of the Baster Gebiet or d i s t r i c t , set out the laws appl icable to
the people within i t , and described the powers of local government to be
exerc i sed by i t s Council and Courts. I t was re jec ted by about 80% of the
Baster burgers who alleged that i t l imited t he i r r i gh t to se l f -de terminat ion ,
made them subject to a l ien laws, and reduced t h e i r t e r r i t o r y . The
members of the community refused to abide by the terms of the agreement, openly
defied the laws, and pe t i t ioned the League of Nations to intervene in the d i spu te .
While the rebel l ion was less than spectacular except perhaps for the cost
involved, the r e su l t might have been qui te d i f fe ren t i f the Basters had achieved
more success in persuading the neighbouring Herero and Nama to jo in them in
t h e i r r e s i s t ance . A long record of Baster col labora t ion with colonial
—• 2 —
authorities no doubt counted against them in this attempt, ' and only
minor cases of Herero opposition occurred before the Union authorities took
action. A brief history of the Baster people may serve to il lustrate
their role in the colonisation of Namibia.
(9)
The core of the Rehoboth community migrated to Namibia in 1868. They
were drawn mainly from the mission stations of de Tuin and Pella which lay
on the northern border of the Cape Colony. They had lost their land to
encroaching Boer pastoralists and had also suffered the depradations of
iKora raiding parties whose stronghold lay in the islands of the Orange
river to the north-east. About 90 Baster families crossed the border
and moved slowly northwards, seeking water and grazing for their substantial
herds. During the journey northwards they drew up a constitution and
elected a Captain, Hermanus van Wyk. This election caused a split in the
p arty and supporters of Klaas Swartz decided to remain at Grootfontein
South in the neighbourhood of Bethanie.
The Herero and their southern neighbours, the Nama, had been at war since
(12)
about 1863, and Rehoboth, which lay between the territories of these
two peoples, had been uninhabited since 1864. The former chief of the
area, Willem Swartbooi, had been forced to flee with his people' to the
protection of Maherero, the Herero Paramount, when he fell out with the
major Nama leader, Jonker Afrikaner.
Van Wyk managed to rent Rehoboth from Swartbooi after negotiating with him
a t the Peace Conference called at Okahandja in 1870. 'The area provided
some of the best grazing in the country and the Basters set to work,
rebuilding the ruined mission house and church, and digging wells. Later
the Basters attempted to buy the land from Swartbooi, but whether this was
(14)successful or not, is not clear.
Rehoboth lay in the path of the Nama and Herero warparties, and despite
-a-ttempts—to remain—neutral in—the continuing conflict between" north a^nd
south, the Basters were drawn into the wars; sometimes on the side of the
Nama, and on other occassions siding with Maherero. Their stock was also
raided by groups of bandits thrown up by the wars. The Basters'
t i t l e to the land was also insecure. Even if Swartbooi had sold the area
(which he denied), there were others who laid claim to i t . Maherero
claimed i t as his by virtue of having given the Swartboois a piece of land
in his own territory",while a Nama tribe to the south denied Swartbooi's
right to i t , and maintained that i t had originally belonged to them. In
addition, the Dorsland trekkers showed an interest in purchasing i t .
As a result of all this uncertainty, the Basters were quick to sign the treaty
offered by the Imperial German Government in 1885. I t promised protection
from other nations and recognised the right of the people to the territory
which they inhabited. As a result of this treaty the Basters became active
collaborators in the process of colonisation. For a number of reasons they
were quite well suited to this position. In cultural terms they were fairly
close to the Germans: many were l i te ra te , all were Christians, products of
the Rhenish missionary Heidmann, who had accompanied them on their trek from
the Cape Colony. Speakers of German, as well as of indigenous languages
and their native Dutch were to be found amongst them. These factors, combined
with skill in horsemanship, waggon driving, and marksmanship, as well as a good
knowledge of the local terrain, made them very usefull allies to the Germans.
They came to serve as soldiers, scouts and transport riders; in the lat ter
area holding a virtual monopoly.
The Schutztruppe, or colonial troops were far too few to *pacify' so large an
(19 )area, so Baster soldiers played an important role m the military.
This was formalised in 1895 when agreement was reached that the Rehoboth
Captain would provide fifty men to serve under a German Officer in return for
(20 )
an annual salary of one thousand marks. These soldiers drew high praise
from military historians and their losses are recorded on a number of monuments
in the territory.
Collaboration cost the Basters dearly not only in lives however, but in liberty
and land. The Captain"... .had been reduced to a position of dependance in
regard to the Government by granting him an annual salary. He (had) thereby
acquired the status of an official and his political independance (was)
licab
(22 )
(21 )
at an end'. An increasing number of colonial laws became appli le to
the Rehoboth Gebiet and by 1903 a German Resident was installed,
significantly reducing the authority of Baster council and courts, while on the
death of Hermanus van Wyk three years later , the German authorities refused to
recognise his son Cornelius as Captain, acknowledging him only as Foreman,
(23 )
and reviewing his position annually.
Despite the fact that " . . . the Rehoboth community in order to keep their own
( 0 L ^
ground, had to a s s i s t the German Government in dispossesing o t h e r s " ,
the loss of land by the indigenous peoples to German s e t t l e r s did not leave the
Bas te r Gebiet unscathed. As the i r importance to the Colonial e f f o r t ,
-de creased—so—did—their—land. The—communi.ty_was_in__no_pos.i,ti.on__tO—xe_s..i_s_t_this.
encroachment; they would have been unable to a l ly themselves with other nat ives
and were too small to r e s i s t the s u b s t a n t i a l l y increased German forces alone.
In the seven years between 189 8 and 1905 a quar te r of a mil l ion hectares
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(25)
of the Gebiet was alienated, some through the redemarcation of boundaries,
some being sold in order to cover the debts of the community and also,
(27)i t was alleged, to raise private revenue for Councillors.
The relationship with the Germans deteriorated steadily. In 1904, with the
outbreak of the Herero war, a large portion of the community was inclined to
( 28)join this rebellion against the Germans. Fischer describes these as
" . . . the poor, the lower social class, the debtors, those dissatisfied with the
prohibition of brandy and those who had nothing to lose". But the influence
of the Captain, his Council and the members of "the more prominent families"
prevailed. The Captain turned over to the German authorities communications
(29 )between Samuel Maherero and Hendrik Witbooi which had been sent through him.
He also provided soldiers for the campaign.
The war reduced the Herero population by four fifths, leaving adequate
land available for German settlement and reducing set t ler pressure for Baster
land. Having been witnesses to what the alternative might be, the Basters
seem to have come to accept their subservient position. Opposition to their
own leaders may have been developing during this period - i t has been suggested
that members of the Beukes family had made representations to the German
(31 )
authorities that Cornelius be denied official recognition as Captain.
Whatever the true position, there is l i t t l e evidence of opposition to the
increasing limitations to their freedom up to the outbreak of the First World
War.
(32)
In a le t ter to the Baster Council dated two weeks after the British
declaration of war against Germany, the Baster council was assured that the
Baster company would not be required to fight against Whites, but was to be
deployed purely "for the purposes of keeping peace and safety in the country"
and to catch thieves. Despite this assurance Baster soldiers were ordered to
( 33)
guard Union prisoners of war. They deserted their posts and the community
rebelled. The Germans reacted harshly to this insurrection on the part of
the i r former a l l i e s , and convoys of Baster_ families fleeing to the security
of the mountain stronghold of Sam Kubis were attacked and murdered by German
patrols . Three children of the Captain were executed, leaving the Basters
without an heir to that position. In a l l , about fifty Basters were killed
or wounded and vast numbers of their stock looted or slaughtered.
Cornelius van Wyk and two members of his Council had managed to slip through
the German lines to Walvis Bay where they interviewed General Botha. He
advised them not to take part in the war, promising that if they remained loyal
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(34)
to the Union "that which you have, at least, you will keep". The Basters
had interpreted their treaty with the Germans in 1885 as being one between
two independent nations and they understood Botha's words as a promise
that this independance would be restored.
Relations between the community and the Union were in i t ia l ly very cordial.
Basters served as scouts in the army for the brief period until the Germans
(35)
surrendered; ' in the Gebiet, owners of rifles were issued with ammunition,
from the military stores in order that they might serve as a "brake" on the
(36 )
possible insurrection of German fanners in the d is t r ic t . They were also
not restricted in the way other natives were in respect of the purchase of
(37 )liquor. In these and many other matters the Council retained a good deal
of authority, the military magistrate of the distr ict having been ordered to
do nothing to limit their independance or status as recognised by the German
(38 )Administration.
Signs that certain members of the community and at least one member of the
Council felt that the Captain was too friendly towards the Government are
evident from magistrates' reports during this early period of South African
rule. There were also other grounds for dissatisfaction with the Council.
Members were suspected of misappropriating funds, favouring their kin,
( 41 )
sel l ing community land for private gain, and being among the heaviest
( 42 )drinkers in the Gebiet.
The intention of the 1923 Agreement was to put relations between the community
and the Union Government on a former legal footing, but Baster hopes for
independance were not to be realised.
I do not intend to examine the terms of the agreement in any detail in this
paper. The main focus will be on relations within the community
rather than between the community and the Union government. The people were
deeply divided over their Council's acceptance of the Agreement and this division
s t i l l has some relevance in Rehoboth politics today. Changed economic
circumstances, the congruence of colour and class, and marriage strategies
were important in the development of this schism and i t is these factors which
I intend to describe here.
About 20% of the Baster population accepted the Agreement which their Council had
._ ___ (43 )
s igned, and remained loyal to the—Unxon~Government. ——' They~were—cal-led—the
Minority Party. The rest (who became known as the Majority Party), rejected
i t and created an impressive alternative pol i t ical , judicial and educational
,44 \
system. They elected a Captain and Council of nine members (called the
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New Council to distinguish i t from the collaborators Old Council) as well
as creating a body known as the Parliamentary Council which had 23 members.
A magistrate was appointed from their own ranks to deal with civil and criminal
cases , a j a i l was constructed, and convicted prisioners were set to work
(46) (47 )
on road repairs. Improvements were made to the village water supply
and two new schools were bu i l t . Taxes of approximately £100 were collected(49 )
and a further £100 subscribed to a widows and orphans' fund.
The rebels were variously referred to as ?the Bolshevic element1,'the inferior
type of Baster1 , 'those with a good deal of native blood1 and 'the poorer
c l a s s e s ' . But the division between the Minority Party and Majority Party
was not a simple one between rich and poor. Although the Majority party did
a t t r a c t most of the poorer people, some were also to be found in the Minority
, (50 ) .
Party and even s i t t ing on i t s Old Council. Certain of the New Council
members were amongst the wealthiest people in the Gebiet. Despite this lack
of a close correlation between level of wealth and poli t ical persuasion,
deteriorating economic circumstances were probably an important contributing
factor to the rebellion and bear examination, particularly since they
provided a means through which the Union authorities were able to put pressure
on the recalcitrants to come to heel.
There is no doubt that the community was becoming progressively poorer. The
main source of wealth derived from stock breeding, and although s ta t i s t ics for
the Gebiet are extremely unreliable, i t is clear that the increase in
s tock was not keeping pace with the growth in human population. Although
some sources show an increase in cattle in the period 1908-1925, the later figure
may have included stock owned by Herero who had moved into the Gebiet
in the intervening period. Even if i t did not, cattle were the capital of
the rich farmer, while small stock, which did not show a significant increase
in these years
 }were the means of subsistence of the poor man, so that the
figures might be interpreted as showing an increasingly uneven distribution of
wealth in the community.
The changing character of the village also provides evidence of a widening
gap between rich and poor in respect of land ownership. In 1908 the townsfolk
were rich farmers who kept houses in the village while Baster bywoners
(52 )
o r non~Baster servants cared for the stock on their farms. By 1925
. . . (53 )
the majority of those living in the town were landless poor. Many had
s old their farms and taken up employment as transport riders or artisans
in Windhoek and other urban centres. Two developments caused a decline in
transport riding. The f i r s t was the rinderpest epidemic of 1897 which destroyed(54 )1 arge numbers of Baster trek oxen. The second was the completion of the
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railway line in 1909,which meant that transport riding became outmoded on
what had been the most lucrative haul between the coast and Windhoek.
Opportunities for artisans were to last a l i t t l e longer than those for transport
r iders, but the First World War and subsequent depression caused a slump
in the building industry in which most Baster artisans were employed. They
were then forced by economic circumstances to return to Rehoboth where their
status as Burgers entitled them to a free house and garden plot in the village.
E x-transport riders and artisans were to be found in the ranks of both political
p arties.
Members of the Old Council and i ts predecessors had been drawn mainly from the
ranks of the wealthy farmers. To some extent their positions were hereditory,
although this was not written into the constitution. The Captain was elected
for life and, with two Councillors whom he appointed, and three others elected
by the community, he controlled most aspects of Rehoboth political and economic
l i f e . The most important element in the Rehoboth economy was grazing land.
Ini t ial ly land had been communally owned, but in 1890 farm t i t les were
issued for land occupied by Council members. These farms were 10,000
hectares in extent, surveying being conducted by riding around the area on
horseback and the journey being timed with a pocket watch. In 1895 the first
t i t l e s were issued to ordinary burgers. These farms were only 7,000
hectares in size. A clause in the t i t l e deed prohibited the sale or
mortgaging of land without the permission of the Captain and Council. A
similar provision applied to the exporting of wood or grass from the property.
Allegations were made that this control over the sale of land was used to the
personal benefit of councillors, but even where land was sold ostensibly
in the interests of the community at large, the wealthy tended to reap the
major benefit. The sale of the 'Debt Farms' is a useful example.
The incomes to be earned from transport riding, particularly during the
establishment of Windhoek as the Capital of the territory, had caused a number
of Basters to seek credit from White storekeepers for the purchase of waggons
(58 )
and equipment. Some had fleets of as many as six waggons and employed
other burgers as drivers and assistants. The collapse of the service left
many in substantial debt. These were mainly rich men, traders being hesitant
to extend credit to the poor. In order to meet the demands of the storekeepers,
. i t became necessary to sell land. White landowners within the boundaries
of the Gebiet had a history of encroaching onto their neighbours' farms, and
so rather than selling the debtors' own farms and running the risk of creating
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more expanding White islands within Baster territory, the Council decided to
dispose of a block of land lying on the eastern border. The area lacked
sufficient surface water for stock farming on any large scale, and was used
(59 )
mainly as a hunting ground for the provision of both meat and game pelts.
The manufacture of karosses and floor mats from these pelts was an industry
on which the wives of poor burgers depended to supplement their incomes.
The intention was that farmers who were dispossed through the sale of these
f arms would be compensated with vacant land within the boundaries of the Gebiet,
but only three cases of this being done are recorded, although as many
as 33 might have lost their land in the transaction. The poor paid the debts
of the rich with their land.
Control over the issue of liquor permits also lay in the hands of the Council.
Its members attempted to extend their control over the very lucrative
(63 )
distribution of liquor through the creation of a community store.
When the authorities intervened and prohibited the sale of alcohol through this
(64 ) .
outlet, the Council tried to have i t s sale outlawed m the whole
Rehoboth dis t r ic t , requesting that certain individuals be granted total
(65 )
exemption from the permit system to purchase liquor only in Windhoek.
This request was refused by the Administrator, who noted that i t would mean
that only those who had the means to get to Windhoek would have access to
liquor, and an i l l i c i t trade controlled by the wealthy could develop as a
(66 )
resu l t .
The refusal to abide by the terms of the Agreement of 1923 led to further
economic disabilities being imposed on supporters of the New Council. The
Union Authorities and the collaborating Old Council tried to use their control
over the export of wood and stock and the issuing of permits for arms and
ammunition to force the recalcitrants to capitulate.
The export of firewood provided one of the few potential avenues for men without
s tock to make a living. It was not a very attractive undertaking for the
supplier. The. _maj_or consumexs__ appear to hay.e_been state organisations in
( 67 )
Windhoek, and the prrce of wood was controlled. The system also
favoured the agents who were White shopkeepers living near the railway line.
The traders paid the suppliers in goods or 'goodfors1, thus extracting a profit
on the goods as well as a handling fee on the wood. It was acknowledged by
the authorities that the scales on which the wood was weighed were rigged to
(68 )
the advantage of the agent. A permit for the export of wood had to be
granted by the Old Council whose right to office the majority of the community
did not accept.
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The New Council reacted to this situation by advertising new prices for wood
and announcing the appointment of i t s own agent in the columns of the
Algemeine Zeitung of 13 September 1924. Woodcutters who continued to acquire
permits from the Old Council had their lives threatened and their waggons
damaged. ^ 6 9 ^ The authorities then threatened to withdraw the trading licences
of those Whites who accepted wood from the Majority Party, and instructed
stationmasters not to rail wood without the necessary permit. This action
did not meet with complete success however. Agents cancelled their
contracts with the New Council ' but continued to export wood which was
allegedly "from their own land'V n o doubt at a greater profit. This
was insufficient to meet the demand however, and the Basters lost their contracts
to other more reliable suppliers/ ' when i t became clear that the woodcutters
did not intend to back down and apply for permits from the Old Council.
Possession of a rifle was a decided economic advantage in Rehoboth. Stockfarmers
were plagued by jackals, and without a rifle there was l i t t l e means of
protecting lambs and kids from these vermin. Game pelts were cured and sold,
as has been mentioned above. Venison could also provide a supplement to the
family diet and reduce the need to slaughter livestock. As would be
expected, the authorities would grant permits to purchase arms and ammunition
only to those Basters whose support for the Agreement was beyond question.
Stock to be sold or exported had to be dipped and branded in terms of regulations
laid down in the Agreement, so that legal markets were closed to those who
refused to abide by the law. Some speculators did risk prosecution and
(76 )
bought unbranded stock and stock which had not been dipped, no doubt at
prices which favoured the purchaser. The refusal by Baster rebels to cooperate
in the government's locust extermination program must have led to another
economic disadvantage through the destruction of pasturage and reduced stock
( 77 )
holding capacities.
While i t is likely that a decreasing share in the economic benefits of the
colonial economy fostered a growing militancy among the poor, the level of
wealth of members of the community and their political affilliation do not
correlate faultlessly. Certain anomalies arise when one examines the
composition of both collaborationist and rebel councils. Of the twelve members
of the Old Council, six were rich farmers, three were poor artisans, one was
a teacher and another a clerk; both of the lat ter being poor men. The
level of wealth and occupation of the twelfth member is not known. The New
Council had seven prosperous and one poor farmer in i t s ranks. The ninth
member was a poor artisan, while details on the tenth councillor were not
(78)
available.
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In 1914 the German Resident in Rehoboth. wrote as follows to his superior in
Windhoek:
"Even today I cannot agree that a large nunber of the Proletariat can
stand in marked contrast to the few mostly hated large landowners.
As time goes on i t might come to pass that such be the case; however the
conglomeration of the nation as a whole, as also of the large families,
can hardly now be influenced by this social question. The influence
of these families, especially van Wijk's and Beukes' together with their
widespread relationship, is no doubt far reaching It is the duty
of the Government to have under their control the elders of these
families". (79)
Nine years later a breach developed between these influential families. The
Union Government retained i ts control over the elders of only some of the
families, while the others used their 'widespread relationship' to enlist the
support of the dispossessed.
The division of the community into distinct upper and lower classes was noted
by Eugen Fischer, a geneticist who conducted research into the Baster community
( 80 )
in 1908. These classes correllated significantly with physical appearance
( caucasoid or Khoi) and to some extent with surname. Upper-class surnames
were Van Wyk, Beukes, Mouton, Diergaardt, and Koopman; while Vries, Orlam,
Witbooi, and Engelbrecht were generally the names of poor and dark-skinned
B as te rs . '
A high degree of class endogamy prevailed and some family endogamy was also
practiced through cousin and second cousin marriage. The latter type of
endogamy has certain economic benefits since the division of land between
heirs favours both males and females equally. Land can thus be consolidated
i n the second generation through cousin marriage, making for fewer dispersed
and economically non-viable units. Endogamy is contradictory to political
( 82 ^
s tabi l i ty . Discrete units without cross-cutting familial bonds develop,
and the unity of the society is threatened by fission unless the political
s tructure is maintained by economic relations and/or ideology, as in the case
of the caste system in India.
Apart from keeping wealth within one family unit, cousin marriage is also
believed to ensure that children resemble their parents in physical appearance.
Where members of the upper class did contract marriages with those of lower
social standing, this most often served to import light-skinned individuals
into the ranks of the wealthy. A further infusion of caucasoid genes took
place when White men (often traders and artisans with small businesses) ' .
took Baster wives. This form of marriage (vorentoetrouery or forward marriage)
( 83 )was encouraged through the offer of a farm as a dowry. Children of such
marriages inherited not only their father's genes, but also his store, smithy or
- 11 -
whatever. In contrast, marriage to Nama or Blacks (.agteruittrouery
or backward marriage) was discouraged, and was practiced mainly by men from the
lower social class. Children of such marriages were prohibited from inheriting
fixed property within the Gebiet and were generally incorporated into the
group from which the mother had derived; taking with them as patrimony whatever
livestock their father had owned. These extra-community marriages thus led
t o an infusion of capital at the top end of the social hierarchy and a drain
a t the bottom.
These mechanisms had led to the development of fairly discrete and relatively
wealthy family segments which were in competition for political power.
This power was mainly in the hands of the ruling segment of the van Wyk family
in 1923. Their genealogy shows the extent to which members of the Old Council
were related to one another, and offers evidence of the marital strategies described
above. A
/ \ - male O-= famale = siblings = marriedcouple
The individuals numbered 1 and 4 were Captains of the community, the son taking
over from his father when the lat ter died in 1906 . Numbers 6, 7, 9, 11 and
12 were councillors in 1925. In the case of the brothers ( 6 and 7) the
tendency towards inheriting political office is evident once again; while
9 , 11 and 12 were wealthy men who had married into political power.
Numbers 4 and 5 (the Captain and his sister) as well as 10 were products of
cousin marriages. (84)
Fischer classified 16.5% of the sample of Basters which he investigated as
European1 in appearance, using such criteria as skin colour, the form and colour
of hair and the shape of the eye. In the genealogy above, numbers 2, 3, 5, 10
and 13 were recorded by him as falling into this group. Although number 3
was a poor man, he increased the caucasoicl componentT~in~the segmen t7~wh i le~9 v^
11 , and 12, all relatively non-caucasoid in appearance, were wealthy men
who were probably attracted to the segment by 'European1 wives and potential
pol i t ical office.
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The correlation between political persuasion and colour is quite significant.
Although only 20% of the total population supported the Old Council, at least
5 2% of those classified by Fischer as 'European1 were to be found in the ranks
of the Minority Party. In contrast, the Majority Party may have attracted
the support of as l i t t l e as 7.5% of this 'European' group.
Although marginally less wealthy and darker, genealogies of the family segments
from which the leadership of the Majority party were drawn show characteristics
similar to those of the members of the Old Council. A large number of members
of the New Council or i t s Parliamentary Council appear on that segment of the van
Wyk genealogy from which the rebel Captain originated,and the politically
active members of the Beukes, Diergaardt and Mouton families were also often
( 87 )
close relatives. The rebellion depended on popular support for i ts success
however, so that the tendency towards the formation of a coterie on the basis
of kinship is not nearly as strong among the rebels as among the collaborators.
Attempts were made to attract as many family segments as was possible to the
Majority Party.
Many leading members of such segments won seats on the Parliamentary Council,
a body which was not provided for in the Baster Constitution. Its duties
were rather vague: members could deputise for Captain's councillors if the
l a t t e r were indisposed; and were also responsible for carrying out the orders
of the Captain and Council and acting as a link between the people and their
( 88 1government. The intention appears to have been to create a body which
was more representative than the Old Council and i ts predecessors.
The election of Niklaas van Wyk as Captain of the New Council was also a political
s trategy designed to attract support from his large and influential family.
There were at least three candidates with qualities of leadership superior to
those of van Wyk. Two were unsuitable because of previous connections with
the Old Council and alleged involvement in certain of i t s malpractices,
while the third, Petrus Diergaardt refused nomination, suggesting that the van
(89 )
_Wy_ks_ might be alienated if the Captaincy passed out of theii: Jiamily.
Seven years after the rebellion, while other members of the New Council
attempted to keep resistance alive in the Gebiet, van Wyk was to prove the
extent of his influence by persuading a large group of former rebels to
(90 )j oin ranks of the Minority Party.
Another innovation intended to make the New Council a more representative body
may have been the broadening of the electorate. There had been indications
that Hereros and other non-Basters living in the Gebiet had had the status
(91 )
of 'Achterburghers1 conferred upon them, J but what exactly this meant in terms
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of rights is not clear. In the election of the rebel leaders, i t was reported
tha t "Kaffirs, Hottentots, strangers who were not members of the community, women
(92 )
and g i r l s were allowed to vote" in the election of rebel leaders.
While the accuracy of this statement, made by the soldier who was la ter to lead
the attack on the vi l lage, is not above question,
which he mentions were important in the rebellion.
(93 )
the attack on the vi l lage, is not above question, a l l of the elements
The passive resistance of the women and children during the assault on the
village has already been mentioned. I t should also be noted that women had
(94 )
peti t ioned the authorities on both the liquor, problem and the pol i t ica l
s i tua t ion , expressing their solidarity with their menfolk in their opposition
to the Agreement.
Certain pol i t ical ly prominent individuals in both the Majority and Minority
parties were not descendants of the original trekkers who had set t led in
Rehoboth. Some, like Franz Maasdorp, the secretary to the Old Council, had
entered the terr i tory only after i t came under the control of the Union forces.
Others were refugees from a German attack on that group which had chosen to
remain in the south under the leadership of Klaas Swartz. The blame for
the spl i t in the community was la ter to be laid at the door of these strangers;
a strategy also used in other small-scale kin-based communities, where unity
(97 )is restored by shifting the responsibility for dissension onto outsiders.
The most important of the elements mentioned by de Jager was undoubtedly the
involvement in the rebellion of non-Basters, and part icularly of the Herero.
( 9 8 1In fact on the 5th of April more Blacks and Nama were arrested than were Basters.
There were a considerable number of Herero in Rehoboth in 1925. One source
indicates that there almost were twice as many non-Baster as Baster stockowners
o who
(100)
(99 )in the Gebiet in 1923: At the end of the 1904-06 war, those Herer  
survived were deprived of their lands and prohibited from owning stock.
With South African occupation, stock ownership was once again permitted, but
l i t t l e land was made available for Herero settlement. The slaughter or
looting of about 10,000 head of Baster - owned stock by German troops during
the 1915 rebellion had left the farms of some burgers understocked.
This land was rented to Herero pastoralists who moved into the Gebiet in
1915. During the period of Baster resistance to the Union Government, these
landlords put pressure on their tenants to refuse to brand or dip their animals;
(102)in some cases threatening them with eviction if they complied with the regulations.
—The—aim-of—the—He r e-r o_s.tockowner s_a t_th is_time..was to increase their herds
(103 )
rather than to breed animals for the market, so the instruction did not
cause them any immediate hardship, and the campaign met with almost complete
(104 )
success. I t was also alleged that the Basters were responsible for the
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spreading of a rumour that the brand used for 'native' cattle was the mark of
the Government, and that the Government intended seizing all stock so branded.
Herero in settlements outside of the Gebiet began to oppose the regulations.
In an incedent at Mariental, 180 kilometers south of Rehoboth, a court building
was stormed by an angry crowd of Herero, many of whom were women; and men who
had been sentenced to imprisonment for failing to brand their stock were
released. Later the crowd gave up the prisoners to the authorities, but a
large number insisted on being jailed as well as a statement of their defiance
of the law. It was also reported from Hoachanas, a Nama and Herero
settlement about 40 kilometers from the south-eastern border of the Gebiet,
that stockowners were refusing to comply with the branding regulations. ^®'
Other reports came from Herero areas to the north. 'Hard-riding emmissaries1
whom the magistrate suspected might have been Basters were met near Okahandja
by unknown people who supplied them with fresh horses at the end of their
j ourney from Ovitoto. The magistrate reported with concern that independance
was being openly discussed on Sandveld farms, and that 'the Savages' were
s tar t ing to resort to 'old customs' such as those which had accompanied the
chosing of chiefs in earlier times.
That opposition was not being expressed against the stock-branding regulations
alone is evident from the school boycott at the mission school in Windhoek.
Herero parents withdrew their children for some weeks when the missionary
refused to comply with their demand that he stop accepting a government
subsidy. Writing to Smuts, the Deupty Administrator noted that while he had
no evidence to connect the two incidents, Baster parents had issued a similar
ultimatum to the missionary in Rehoboth a short while before.
Theft of stock from White farmers, a crime which the branding regulations were
designed to prevent, was also increasing; and the Herero were reported as
becoming 'exceedingly truculent'. The concern felt by many settlers was
summed up by one Bassingthwaite in a conversation with the Rehoboth magistrate.
H e was reported as having said that "whi.le.he considered..the Bas_tards_as a .
rule rather cowardly and short of ammunition the Herero once roused
were brave and warlike".
Without the involvement of the Herero, the Union Government might have been
content to bide i t s time and use the considerable economic leverage i t was able
to bring to bear in order to force the Basters into obedience through means
other than military action. But the Herero represented a far more difficult
problem. The major obstacle was that the land on which the Government hoped
to settle Union farmers had originally been taken from the Herero by the Germans
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in 1906 at the end of the waar and that there was a large population of
pastoralists of this group without reserve areas. The massacre of the Herero
had been the strongest argument against the return of the colony to the
Germans, and any action against these people by the holders of the
Mandate would have undoubtedly raised questions in the League of Nations.
The Union Government's exercise of the Mandate had already come under scrutiny
as a result of their action against the Bondelswarts in 1922. A rebellion
by the Herero would have been more difficult to contain^ ' and the international
repercussions of military action might have led to the revocation of the Mandate.
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